
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
How Do Labor Markets Affect Crime?
New Evidence on an Old Puzzle
IZA DP No. 4856
March 2010
David B. Mustard 
How Do Labor Markets Affect Crime? 





David B. Mustard 
University of Georgia 














P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











How Do Labor Markets Affect Crime? 
New Evidence on an Old Puzzle
* 
 
For nearly 50 years academics have been studying how labor markets affect crime. The 
initial interesting and important theoretical and empirical work generated substantial interest 
in studying crime among economists, in particular, and scholars in the social sciences more 
broadly. This literature, which is decades old and contains hundreds of papers, is 
characterized by an intriguing puzzle – the large gap between the theory and empirical work. 
While the hypothesis that growing labor markets reduce crime seems obvious and is widely 
accepted by many policy makers and academics, empirical results fail to show consistent 
evidence in support of this theory. The primary contribution of this chapter is to document 
how recent research – primarily since the late 1990s – makes substantial progress in 
resolving this disconnect between the theory and empirics. To accomplish this goal, I discuss 
a few very important empirical problems that until the last 10 years have not been 
systematically addressed. The central conclusion of this chapter is that recent research that 
addresses these important questions consistently provides evidence to buttress the 
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1. Introduction 
  For nearly 50 years academics have been studying the extent to which labor markets 
affect crime. Fleisher (1963) used data from the Uniform Crime Reports between 1932 and 1961 
to examine how the unemployment rates of young males in Boston, Cincinnati, and Chicago 
affected juvenile delinquency. He estimated that elasticities of unemployment rates of males 
between ages 16 and 24 to crime were about .10 to .25. Fleisher (1966) explored census tract 
data from the Chicago area between 1958 and 1961 and data from 101 cities with population in 
excess of 25,000. He concluded that higher unemployment and lower median income of those in 
the poorest quartile both increased the arrests of young men.  
  Becker (1968) developed a formal theory of crime that modeled the social cost of crime, 
the cost of apprehension and conviction, the supply of offenses, and punishments. This approach 
links the number of offenses committed by an individual ( j O ) to his probability of conviction (
j p ), his punishment or fine if convicted  j f , and other variables ( j u ) as follows:  
) , , ( j j j j j u f p O O = . 
While this model provided the groundwork for further theoretical and empirical advances in the 
economics of crime, it primarily focused on how the supply of offenses is affected by changes in 
the probability of being caught and the fine incurred if caught, and said little directly about the 
link between legal labor market opportunities and crime, which occurs through  j u , the 
portmanteau variable.  
  Ehrlich (1973) developed a more complete theoretical treatment of crime and market 
opportunities. In his model, individuals allocate time to the legal and illegal sectors. Ehrlich 
argues that the average potential illegal payoff is proxied by the relative variation in the median 
value of transferrable goods and assets or family income and that the mean income level of those   3
below the state’s median proxies for the variation in the mean legal opportunities available to 
potential offenders. He uses a repeated cross-section of state-level data from the 1940, 1950, and 
1960 Censuses, and employs two-stage least squares (2SLS) and seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) to account for endogeneity. 
  Ehrlich finds that crime is positively related to both the median state income and the 
percentage of families that are below one-half of the median income. The elasticities are positive, 
statistically significant and greater than one. Variations in these variables explain more of the 
variation property than violent crime, especially murder. There is also a strong positive 
relationship between income inequality and property crime. However, he classifies the results of 
the effect of unemployment on crime as “generally disappointing”. These estimated effects of 
unemployment on crime were “not stable across different regressions and do not appear 
significantly different from zero.” (p. 555).  
  This initial interesting and important theoretical and empirical work generated substantial 
interest in studying crime among economists, in particular, and scholars in the social sciences 
more broadly. Hundreds of papers analyze how labor markets affect crime, and many more 
discuss the relationship in some manner or control for labor market variables while exploring 
other questions related to crime. Many reviews have been published in this large and dynamic 
field. Some of the most prominent reviews include Long and Witte (1981), Freeman (1983), 
Chiricos (1987), Freeman (1995), Piehl (1998), Fagan and Freeman (1999), and Bushway and 
Reuter (2001). Levitt (2004) and Blumstein and Wallman (2006) are broader summaries that 
discuss the labor markets as a subset of many factors that affect crime.  
  The relationship between labor markets and crime is not the sole domain of academic 
researchers; policy makers also exhibit great interest in better understanding this relationship.   4
Piehl (1998) describes how this topic has important implications for both macro-level policy and 
for micro-level interventions. To the extent that a vibrant economy and labor markets reduce 
crime, a stronger case can be made for pursuing pro-growth macro policies, such as tax 
reductions. If improved labor market opportunities help individuals devote more time and effort 
to the legal sector and less to illegal activity, there may be a greater justification for educational 
or job training programs.  
  An important and striking theme of the existing reviews is that the empirical work shows 
that labor markets have little consistent effect on crime, which is true for the estimated 
magnitude of the effects, the statistical significance, and even more surprisingly, for the sign of 
the effect. Early reviews, like Freeman (1983) and Chiricos (1987) generally find small, positive 
effects of unemployment on crime, but the results are inconsistent across studies and are 
certainly not major determinants of crime. Freeman (1983, p. 106) concludes that crime and 
unemployment “fail to show a well-defined, quantifiable linkage.” Chiricos (1987), who reviews 
sixty-three studies, describes the empirical evidence as “inconsistent, insignificant, and weak”. 
Piehl (1998) asserts that there is surprisingly little evidence to support the proposition that 
economic conditions influence crime rates. She opens her chapter by stating, “While many 
citizens, policy makers, politicians, and academics assume that economic conditions drive crime 
rates, evidence of this relationship has proved elusive. As a result, there is a large disconnect 
between theory and empirical evidence on this point.” (p. 302)  
  This literature, which is decades old and contains hundreds of papers, is characterized by 
an intriguing puzzle—the large gap between the theory and empirical work. While the hypothesis 
that growing labor markets reduce crime seems obvious and is widely accepted by many policy 
makers and academics, empirical results fail to show consistent evidence in support of this   5
theory. The primary contribution of this chapter is to document how recent research—primarily 
since the late 1990s—makes substantial progress in resolving this disconnect between the theory 
and empirics. To accomplish this goal, I discuss a few very important empirical problems that 
until the last 10 years have not been systematically addressed. The central conclusion of this 
chapter is that recent research that addresses these important questions consistently provides 
evidence to buttress the contention that labor market opportunities have important effects on 
crime, especially property crime.  
  Because the research on how labor markets affect crime is exhaustive, I do not attempt to 
document all the studies or topics pertaining to this relationship. Instead, where appropriate I cite 
the existing reviews that do an excellent job of summarizing the research at the time of their 
publication. This review is unique in that I structure it around important problems that 
researchers of this topic consistently face. These problems have historically jeopardized our 
ability to identify the model and establish causality, thus creating the gap between the theory and 
empirical work.  
 
2. Research Context 
  Before examining the specific problems, it is helpful to provide some contextual 
background that includes the theory, data, and some important trends in the research. Because 
many reviewers carefully document the theoretical developments and variations, my remarks on 
this matter are brief. As discussed above, Ehrlich (1973) laid the theoretical underpinnings. Since 
then, criminologists, economists, and sociologists have further developed the theoretical details. 
Cantor and Land (1985), one of the seminal sociology papers in this field, articulates two 
hypotheses of how aggregate unemployment affects aggregate crime. The first is the criminal   6
opportunity effect and the second is a criminal motivation effect. Reuter et al. (1990) and 
Freeman (1999) document how the majority of those who participate in the illegal sector 
simultaneously derive income from legitimate jobs. Supplying labor to both systems implies 
either that crime does not offer enough hours at a sufficiently high wage, and people supplement 
their income with other work, or crime and legal work are not substitutes. Piehl (1998) 
documents at least seven variations on the basic theory, some of which emphasize the behavior 
of individuals while others operate at the macro level.  
  There are also some more recent theoretical innovations. Burdett et al. (2003) use an 
equilibrium search model to allow crime, unemployment, and inequality to be endogenous. They 
document how the possibility of criminal activity can raise wage inequality among homogeneous 
workers and how the possibility of crime can naturally generate multiple equilibria. 
Consequently, two fundamentally identical neighborhoods may have different levels of 
unemployment, inequality, and crime. They also explore the general equilibrium effects of both 
anti-crime policies (like changes in the sentence length) and labor market policies, such as 
unemployment insurance. Huang et al. (2004) use a dynamic general equilibrium framework to 
study the relationship between unemployment and crime. In the context of this search-
equilibrium model in which agents choose between legal employment and crime-related 
activities, crime acts like a tax on human capital by affecting the probability that a worker's 
earnings are subsequently appropriated. Like Burdett et al., Huang et al. (2004) find multiple 
steady-state equilibria with high crime, low education, long periods of unemployment, and 
poverty being correlated. Lochner (2004) develops a framework that examines how increases in 
human capital from education and training affect the opportunity cost of crime from foregone   7
work and expected costs associated with incarceration. He studies the effects that education, 
training, wage subsidies, and enforcement policies have on criminal behavior.  
  Most of the research about labor markets and crime focuses on the United States, and the 
most commonly used source of aggregate data is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR, which started in 1929 is a nationwide system whereby law 
enforcement officials compile reported offenses for seven felonies—murder, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. These seven offenses are referred to as 
Index I crimes and are classified into two groups. The first four are considered violent crimes or 
crimes against people, and the last three are considered property crimes. The FBI aggregates 
these reported offenses to the county, Metropolitan Area, state, and national levels. Because it 
does not systematically track other offenses like drug dealing, embezzlement, tax evasion, and 
money laundering by geographic area, the majority of research examines these seven offenses. 
Consequently, we know relatively little about how labor markets affect other crimes. The 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) is frequently used for individual data. This 
longitudinal study started in 1979 as a nationally representative survey of 14 to 21-year-olds and 
oversamples minority and disadvantaged youth. Although it follows the respondents over time, 
its criminal participation questions were asked in only one year, thus precluding the opportunity 
to learn how individual propensities to engage in illegal activities change in different contexts. 
Other data sources include administrative records for specific police jurisdictions like Atlanta, 
Chicago, or New York.  
  The initial research was disproportionately at the national or state level, but over time 
research has increasingly used smaller areas of analysis—like counties, cities, neighborhoods, 
and individuals. Freeman (1995) and Levitt (2001) contend that the national level time series   8
data yield little meaningful results. It is very important to examine smaller units of analysis 
because there is extensive variation in both local labor markets (Topel, 1994) and crime (Glaeser 
et al., 1996; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). Frequently variation in crime and labor markets is 
greater within than across states. Consequently, research that utilizes smaller units of analysis 
generally shows a tighter nexus between labor markets and crime. Freeman (1995, p. 184) states, 
“The strongest evidence that economic incentives are important in determining the crime rate 
comes from studies of individuals.” 
  Until recently, nearly all of the empirical literature that examines the relationship 
between legal labor market opportunities and crime used data from the United States. Efforts to 
explore crime across nations show limited success. Cross-national data yield little persuasive 
evidence because of the difficulty in comparing data across nations and the many unobserved 
differences across nations in important factors that influence labor markets and crime. However, 
an interesting development has been the recent growth of high quality studies that examine the 
labor market-crime link within other nations. In the last few decades, the economic performance 
of the U.S. has far exceeded European economic growth. While labor market opportunities in the 
U.S. generally expanded between 1990 and 1997, Fougere et al. (2009) document how 
unemployment rates in France increased by about 50 percent during this same period. Also, 
property crime rates in Europe increased substantially relative to their American counterparts. 
Machin and Meghir (2004) document how property crime in the U.K. and Wales increased 
steadily since 1975. Property crimes and some violent crimes (although not murder) are now 
higher in many European nations than the U.S. While the rapid growth in studies from other 
countries is promising, the quality of these studies varies widely. From a methodological 
standpoint some international studies are similar to the methods used in the US 30 years ago—  9
they suffer omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and measurement error, and do a poor job of truly 
identifying causal effects. At the same time, some studies with international data are technically 
sophisticated and use cutting edge empirical techniques. This chapter discusses many recent and 
quality studies from outside the United States. Because previous surveys are nearly silent on 
international research, this emphasis is another unique aspect of this review. 
 
3. Problems in Estimating the Effect of Labor Markets on Crime 
  I now examine some important issues that those who study this problem need to address. 
I define each problem, examine the progress that has been made in solving the problem, cite 
papers that address the concern, and outline areas for future research.  
 
A. Omitted variable bias 
  To the extent that variables omitted from the regression are correlated with our measures 
of labor market success, there is scope for omitted variable bias. Early studies, like Fleischer 
(1963, 1966) and Ehrlich (1973), include only a few control variables, which make it difficult to 
control for unobserved differences across areas that may affect crime. Unfortunately, this 
problem persisted, as all but a few studies written through the early 1990s control for more than a 
half-dozen variables. Fortunately, as data collection and computing capacity increased 
substantially over time, there has been marked progress in the ability to reduce the scope of 
omitted variables by controlling for an extensive array of economic, social, demographic, and 
criminological factors.  
  However, even after including a host of control variables, there may still be omitted 
variable bias because there are unobserved differences across regions that are correlated with   10
labor markets or criminal activity. An important development in mitigating omitted variable bias 
from unobserved variables is the increased use of panel data estimation techniques that allow 
researchers to control for time and area fixed effects and area-specific time trends. In the last ten 
years many studies have used such techniques, and these studies consistently document a 
relationship between some labor market measure and crime.  
  Doyle et al. (1999) use U.S. state-level panel data from 1984 to 1993 to estimate how 
wages influence crime. They use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across 
states, and measure labor market opportunities with an expected wage that considers wages, 
unemployment compensation, and the unemployment rate. They find strong evidence that wages, 
especially those in low-skilled sectors, decrease both property and violent crime, and that wages 
explain a greater amount of variation in crime than do unemployment rates.  
  Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), who use state-level panel data from 1970 to 1993, 
include state-specific time trends, state effects, and year effects. Their results indicate that a 
substantial portion of the decline in property crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the 
decline in the unemployment rate, with much weaker effects on violent crime.  
  Gould et al. (2002) run panel regressions using county, metropolitan area (MA), and 
state-level data from 1979-1997 with time and area fixed-effects. They conclude that both wages 
and unemployment of low-skilled males affects crime, and that the effect of wages on crime is 
greater than the effect of unemployment.  
  Papps and Winkelman (2002) study panel data for sixteen New Zealand regions between 
1984 and 1996. The authors use both random and fixed effects models to establish causality 
between unemployment and crime, and conclude that unemployment raises both crime totals and 
some subcategories of crime.    11
  The New Earnings Survey (NES) provides Machin and Meghir (2004) with panel data on 
the police force areas
 of England and Wales between 1975 and 1996. While they conclude that 
the unemployment rate is not statistically significant, they assert that many wage measures 
consistently reduce property crime.  
  A panel of Swedish counties between 1988 and 1999 laid the foundation for Edmark 
(2005). Because this period in Sweden is characterized by turbulence in the labor market and 
great variation in unemployment rates, it provides a unique opportunity to examine 
unemployment effects. Her results show that unemployment has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the property crimes of burglary, car theft and bike theft. 
  Arvanites and Defina (2006) use state-level panel data from 1986 to 2000 to study the 
conceptual framework of Cantor and Land (1985) that distinguishes between opportunity and 
motivation effects. Instead of using the unemployment rate, which is the most commonly used 
variable, they develop alternative measures that more faithfully capture the logic of the 
argument. They conclude that the strong economy of the 1990s reduced all index property crimes 
and robbery.  
  Using unique district-level panel data from Bavaria between 1835 and 1861, Mehlum et 
al. (2006) estimate the effect of poverty on crime. They use rainfall to instrument the price of 
rye, which was the primary determinant of living standards at that time, and conclude that a one-
standard deviation increase in the price of rye raised property crime by 8 percent.  
  Ihlanfeldt (2007) investigates panel data of census tracts to explore the relationship 
between drug crime and young males’ intra-urban job accessibility. Controlling for time and 
fixed effects along with many other potential sources of bias, he documents how modest   12
improvements in job access can substantially reduce the amount of drug crime within poor inner-
city neighborhoods. 
  By including many control variables and using panel data strategies, these studies net out 
both observed and unobserved differences across regions. This research identifies the 
relationship between labor markets and crime from variations over time within areas rather than 
across areas. In doing so, this research reduces the scope of omitted variable bias and 
consistently concludes that labor markets (especially wages) have important roles in reducing 
crime. These results are encouraging in that they are being documented not only in the United 
States, but also in nations throughout the world. 
 
B. Reverse Causality 
  Reverse causality, discussed by Ehrlich (1973) is a very important, but rarely analyzed 
identification problem in this literature. To the extent that crime affects labor markets, the OLS 
estimates of crime on labor market measures will be biased. Freeman (1995) and Piehl (1998) 
survey a few papers that examine this endogenous effect. Some research, primarily which 
focuses on those who have been convicted of crime or who have spent time in prison finds no 
effect or only a moderate effect of criminal participation on earning capacity. Using a sample of 
male arrestees from California, Grogger (1995) concluded that the earnings and employment 
effects are relatively short-lived, that convictions have little effect on future earnings, and that 
probation has no effect on arrestees’ subsequent earnings. In a sample of prison releases, Needles 
(1996) concludes that the length of time in prison did not affect the earnings of those who 
participated in the legal labor market.     13
  In contrast, most studies conclude that criminal participation has a significant impact on 
both subsequent legal employment and earnings. Those who have been convicted of a crime or 
who have been incarcerated could experience reduced earnings through a variety of mechanisms, 
such as the loss of personal professional licenses, increased difficulty in obtaining employment, 
exclusion from some unions, harmful reputational effects, and the delay or denial in obtaining a 
business licenses. In addition, their future earnings may be reduced by recidivism, because those 
who are incarcerated have an increased risk of recidivism. Using the NLSY, Freeman (1992) 
estimates that a young male who was in prison in 1979 worked about 25 percent less during the 
subsequent eight years than a similar young man who had no prison record. Lott (1992) estimates 
the monetary penalty borne by those convicted of drug offenses and contends that those who 
return to the labor force suffer large penalties in the form of reduced legitimate earnings, and that 
the overall penalty increases dramatically with the level of pre-conviction income. He concludes 
that on average, lost post-conviction income accounts for between 35 and 96 percent of the total 
pecuniary penalty.  
  Sampson and Laub (1990) analyze the data from the Glueck and Glueck (1950) study of 
delinquent and non-delinquent boys born between 1924 and 1935. They conclude that seven 
indicators of adult crime and deviance are much more prevalent among men who were childhood 
delinquents. Sampson and Laub (1997) estimate that time in jail reduces job stability and 
elevates the risk of recidivism. Allgood et al. (2006), who examine a broadly representative 
sample of young males rather than studying only ex-offenders, find that although having been 
charged with a crime has little impact on future wages but being convicted lowers future 
earnings by about 10 to 12 percent.   14
  Crime may also influence the decision of firms to relocate or expand, thus affecting 
overall employment opportunities. Greenbaum and Tita (2004) use panel data at the ZIP code 
level to examine the effect of violence surges on the
 creation, destruction, and growth of business 
establishments
 in five large US cities between 1987 and 1994. After controlling for
 pre-existing 
levels of violence, they find that increases in the homicide rate reduce the number of new 
businesses and the growth of employment in existing firms; an effect that is greatest for service-
related establishments.  
  The direction of the potential endogeneity bias is not entirely clear a priori. Cullen and 
Levitt (1999) contend that high-income individuals and employers leave areas with high or 
increasing crime rates. Conversely, Willis (1997) concludes that low-wage employers in the 
service sector are more likely to relocate due to increasing crime rates. Also, higher crime rates 
may force employers to pay higher wages as a compensating differential to workers (Roback 
1982). 
  Previous reviewers urged researchers to address endogeneity more seriously. Levitt 
(2001) and Bushway and Reuter (2001) both highlight the importance of dealing with 
endogeneity as a condition for making future strides in this area. Piehl (1998) clearly and 
succinctly states, “The literature on economic conditions and crime needs empirical studies that 
use simultaneous models, so that the causality of crime on economics and that of economics on 
crime are both incorporated.” In spite of these encouragements to address endogeneity, only a 
few papers that evaluate labor markets and crime try to address this concern.  
  In their state-level panel data set, Doyle et al. (1999) apply a GMM estimator to control 
for simultaneity bias and find strong evidence that wages decrease both property and violent 
crime and that income inequality has no effect on crime. Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001), who   15
study state-level panel data from 1970 to 1993, use defense contracts and a state-specific 
measure of exposure to oil shocks as instruments for unemployment rates. Using 2SLS they 
estimate that the elasticity of unemployment on property crime was about 2.8 to 5.0 percent, 
about twice as large as their OLS estimates. These results of unemployment on property crime 
rates are stable across model specifications and imply that a substantial portion of the decline in 
property crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the decline in the unemployment rate. 
Their evidence for violent crime is considerably weaker.  
  To develop instruments Gould et al. (2002) interact three sources of variation that are 
exogenous to the change in crime within each state: (1) the initial industrial composition in the 
state, (2) the national industrial composition trends in employment in each industry, and (3) 
biased technological change within each industry, as measured by the changes in the 
demographic composition within each industry at the national level. They also exploit cross-
industry variations in the changes in industrial shares of four demographic groups (gender 
interacted with educational attainment). For example, the trends in the Michigan automobile 
industry and the Bay Area computing technology sector are extremely different. The decline in 
the auto industry’s share of national employment will adversely affect Michigan’s demand for 
labor more than California’s. If biased technological change causes the auto industry to reduce 
its employment of unskilled men, this affects the demand for unskilled labor in Michigan more 
than in California. They conclude that endogeneity is not responsible for the significant 
relationship between the labor market conditions of unskilled workers and the various crime 
rates. 
  Lochner and Moretti (2004) contend that the underlying education and human capital 
affects individuals’ labor market prospects. Using data from the NLSY, Census, and UCR, they   16
estimate the effect of education on participation in criminal activity using changes in state 
compulsory schooling laws over time to account for the endogeneity of schooling decisions. 
They assert that schooling significantly reduces the probability of incarceration and arrest, and 
estimate that the social savings from crime reduction associated with high school graduation for 
men is about 14 to 26 percent of the private return. 
  Lin (2008) analyzes a panel of states from 1974 to 2000. Using OLS, Lin finds that a 
one-percentage-point increase in the average unemployment rate raises property crime by 1.8 
percent. To instrument unemployment, Lin uses the changes in the real annual exchange rates 
multiplied by the percentage of state manufacturing sector employees of GDP value. The real 
exchange rate is calculated by the average foreign exchange rates of all trade partners weighted 
by trade volume. By weighting the manufacturing employee percentage, Lin measures the 
specific changes in the real exchange rate dollar appreciation to which each state is exposed in a 
given year. These 2SLS results indicate that the elasticity increases to about 4 to 6 percent, which 
is about two to three times larger than the OLS estimate, and explains about 30 percent of the 
property crime change during the 1990s.  
  In the first systematic analysis of how labor markets affect crime in France, Fougere et al. 
(2009) use both individual data and departement-level data (similar to county-level data in the 
U.S.) between 1990 and 2000. Using the predicted industrial structure to instrument 
unemployment, they contend that increase in unemployment increase burglaries, thefts, and drug 
offenses. Furthermore, changes in youth unemployment have particularly large effects on these 
offenses.   
  Some recent theoretical papers formally model this reverse causality. The models in 
Burdett et al. (2003) and Huang et al. (2004) allow crime, unemployment, and inequality to be   17
endogenously determined using general equilibrium frameworks, which allows the authors to 
explore alternative interactions among the variables and to discuss some general-equilibrium 
effects that are often neglected. 
  Although many areas of economics have a long history of addressing endogeneity, only 
in recent years has research that examines how labor markets affect crime made a concerted 
effort to attend to this concern. In the past ten years, there have been a number of both theoretical 
and empirical papers that systematically seek to account for reverse causality. These initial 
efforts are promising and show that labor market proxies have consistent salutary effects on 
crime. Some, but not all, studies report substantially larger estimated effects with 2SLS than with 
OLS. Because these efforts are fairly modest, there are ample opportunities for future research to 
explore the nature and magnitude of the bias from reverse causality. Research from other nations 
that use different instruments and identification strategies will also help us better understand the 
degree to which endogeneity affects our estimates.  
 
C. How Should we Measure Labor Market Opportunities?  
  There has also been an important change in the type of labor market variables that are 
commonly used. In the first few decades of this research, most studies used unemployment rates. 
This focus is evident in the titles of the early literature reviews. Freeman (1983) is titled “Crime 
and Unemployment” and Chiricos (1987) is titled “Rates of Crime and Unemployment”. Piehl 
(1998) highlights one paper that uses wages, but it primarily examines the simultaneous response 
that participation in crime lowers earnings and employment rates Needles (1996). While Fagan 
and Freeman (1999) offer a detailed account of the research on how illegal wages affect crime, 
they discuss only one published paper and one working paper of how legal wages affect crime.    18
  While Freeman (1996), Wilson (1996), and Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) speculate 
that the declining wages and employment opportunities of unskilled men contribute to their 
increasing involvement in crime, wages are rarely included as labor market measures compared 
to unemployment and average income, which are commonly used. This omission is surprising, 
because wages may be a better measure for the labor market prospects of potential criminals. 
Unemployment rates may drop even when underlying labor market conditions become worse, 
because people may leave the labor force if they think it unlikely that they will find work. More 
important, however, is that unemployment is often short-lived and highly cyclical. Given the 
potentially long-lasting effects of incarceration and investing in human capital specific to the 
criminal sector, crime may be more responsive to long-term changes in labor market conditions 
than to short-term fluctuations. A secular decline in unskilled wages, as seen during the late 
1970s and 1980s, represents a decline in the permanent wages of uneducated workers, while 
cyclical unemployment fluctuations have more temporary implications.  
  Figure 1 clearly illustrates the different patterns of unemployment and wages for non-
college males who work full time and are between the ages of 18 and 65. In 1997, their 
unemployment rate was the same as it was in 1979, the first year of the period. During the 
intervening years, the unemployment rate increases slightly during the two recessions in the early 
1980s and early 1990s and cycles back down. In sharp contrast, the real wage measure steadily 
decreases through most of the period and in 1997 was over 20 percent lower than it was in 1979.  
  Similarly, using county-level data, Figure 2 documents that between 1979 and 1997, per 
capita income increased 15 percent while wages dropped by over 30 percent in the retail sector, 
which employs a disproportionately large share of low-skilled men who are more likely to 
engage in illegal activity. Because the trends are distinctly different, relying on income and   19
unemployment as proxies for the labor market prospects of low-skilled males will necessarily 
generate very different point estimates. Also, it is important to include both measures in the 
regressions to control for any correlation between the labor market prospects of less educated 
men and the overall economic prosperity of the area, which may proxy for the level of wealth 
available to steal. 
  Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) use seven years of county-level panel data from North 
Carolina primarily study how measures of deterrence affect crime. They do, however, include the 
average weekly wage for nine industries as control variables. These average wage measures 
show little consistent effect either in sign or the level of statistical significance.  
  Grogger (1998) is the first large-scale systematic study to explore the effect of wages on 
illegal activity and to control for a number of other factors. He uses a structural model with 
individual-level data from the NLSY, and estimates the relationship between wage offers and the 
property crimes committed by these young men. He finds that criminal participation of young 
men is negatively related to their potential wages, explaining “three-quarters of the observed rise 
in youth crime.” Grogger concludes that youth behavior responds to price incentives and that 
falling real wages were an important determinant of rising youth crime during the 1970s and 
1980s. Moreover, wage differentials explain a substantial component of both the racial 
differential in criminal participation and the age distribution of crime. 
  Doyle et al. (1999) find that wages in the low-skilled sectors of wholesale and retail trade 
reduce crime, a result that is robust across many specifications. A one-percent increase in wages 
in the retail and wholesale sectors decreases crime by between 0.3 and 0.9 percent. This effect of 
wages on crime is larger than the effect of unemployment on crime and the effect sizes are larger 
for property than violent crime.    20
  Gould et al. (2002) use a non-structural approach to exploit the differences in the timing 
of wage changes across geographic areas. In alternative specifications they use the weekly wage 
of non-college educated males and the retail wage, which is a proxy for the wages of non-
college-educated men. They find that increases in the wages of low-skilled men reduce property 
crime more than violent crime and that wage measures are much more important than 
unemployment for explaining the changes in crime rates. They also explain the ten-year change 
in crime rates by the ten-year change in the average wage and unemployment rate of non-college 
men. This strategy exploits the low frequency variation in the data. Given the long-term 
consequences of criminal activity, crime should be more responsive to low frequency changes in 
labor market conditions. This long-term regression approach also attenuates measurement error 
problems in panel regression analyses. Griliches and Hausman (1986) and Levitt (1998) discuss 
advantages of the “long regression” in the presence of measurement error. 
  Hansen (2003) explores the role of education on crime. She uses self-reported survey data 
collected from 2,529 young males aged 16–25 in England and Wales to contrast the age-crime 
profiles of those who left school at age 16 with those who continue their education past the 
compulsory school leaving age. She documents that for all ages and all three offense types 
(property offenses, handling offenses, and violent offenses), the crime-age profiles for the less 
educated are higher than the profile for the more educated group. The gap is reduced when 
controlling for other factors, including the specific school that one attended.  
  Narayan and Smyth (2004) apply Granger causality tests to examine the relationship 
between seven categories of property and violent crime with male youth unemployment and real 
male average weekly earnings in Australia from 1964 to 2001 within a cointegration and vector 
error correction framework. They conclude that fraud, homicide and motor vehicle theft are   21
cointegrated with male youth unemployment and real male average weekly earnings. However, 
they find no evidence of a long-run relationship between breaking and entering, robbery, serious 
assault or stealing with male youth unemployment and real male average weekly earnings. 
  Machin and Meghir (2004) use the New Earnings Survey (NES) to obtain panel data on 
the police force areas
 of England and Wales between 1975 and 1996. They examine how changes
 
in wages at the bottom end of the distribution affect crime rates. They use different wage
 
measures to identify those who are on the margins of legal and illegal activity. They use the 25
th 
percentile of both the overall wage distribution, the wages in the retail sector where low-skill 
workers typically work, and a selection corrected wage, which they interpret as the absolute 
value of the lower bound of the impact of wages on crime. Machin and Meghir conclude that 
coefficient estimates of the unemployment rate are not statistically significant; once they control 
for wages, unemployment is of little importance. However, they also find that decreases in the 
wages of low-wage workers increase
 vehicle, theft, and burglary.  
  In a theoretical paper Lochner (2004) develops a model of crime in which human capital 
increases the opportunity cost of crime from foregone work and expected costs associated with 
incarceration. He contends that the underlying human capital of potential offenders may be even 
more influential than wages in affecting crime, and explores the effects of education, training, 
and wage subsidies on criminal behavior. 
  To summarize, we can use many measures of labor market opportunities and we need to 
think carefully about which labor market measures are best suited for the theory. Although 
historically the emphasis has largely been placed on using unemployment rates (which exhibit 
little long-term trend) or per capita income (which shows some small increases), these measures 
have demonstrably different time patterns than the wages of low-skilled, poorly educated men,   22
which have dropped substantially in recent decades. Despite the marked differences in methods, 
data, and nation of study, research that includes both unemployment and wages consistently find 
that wages are much more important for explaining variations in crime than are unemployment 
rates. Further efforts to expand the traditional measure of labor market success to include wages 
and underlying measures of human capital are promising avenues of research.  
 
D. Averages or Margins? 
  Historically, the most commonly used variables to proxy the labor market opportunities 
are average income, wages, and unemployment rates. Although Ehrlich (1973) carefully 
identifies the problems that average measures may create, researchers have too often included 
average measures of labor market success in the regressions without carefully evaluating exactly 
how they relate to the underlying variables of theoretical interest. Ideally, we want to identify the 
variables that best measure the labor market opportunities for those who are on the margin of 
substituting between the legal and illegal sectors.  
  Population averages may be problematic for a few reasons. First, they may not identify 
those who are on the margin and are the most likely to substitute from one sector to another. 
Suppose that the average income in an area decreases or its average unemployment rate increases 
because of a disproportionately large drop in employment opportunities for those in the high end 
of the income distribution. While such a change clearly reduces average employment 
opportunities, it may have little impact on crime rates, because few people in the high income 
group will engage in illegal activity. Conversely, a disproportionately large drop in market 
opportunities for those who are on the margin between the sectors will moderately reduce the   23
average measures, but may have a significant impact on crime. In either case, the estimated 
effects will be biased because the averages either overstate or understate the true impact.  
  This type of analysis goes beyond high and low-income people. Men engage in criminal 
activity at much higher rates than women, people between the ages of 16 and 24 are more likely 
to commit crime than the elderly, and those with relatively little education commit crime at 
higher rates than those with a lot of education. Because these differences are large and important, 
we must strive to identify variables that truly measure the labor market opportunities for people 
on the margin if legal and illegal activity.  
  A second problem in using averages is that they may have multiple effects that offset 
each other. For example, high unemployment may increase the crime rate by lowering the 
marginal return to legitimate earning activities and increasing the time available to engage in 
criminal activity. High unemployment may simultaneously attenuate crime by reducing the 
supply of suitable targets and increasing the probability that an offender is caught by having 
more people at home. Similarly, a region that has higher income may have greater opportunities 
for people to substitute from the illegal labor market into the legal one, but may also have more 
resources available for criminals to steal. Additionally, higher income individuals invest more in 
self-protection from criminals, which may attenuate crime. For example, Lott and Mustard 
(1997) and Ayres and Levitt (1998) showed that self-protection lowers crime by carrying 
concealed weapons and purchasing Lojack, respectively. Benson and Mast (2001) examine the 
role of privately produced deterrence more broadly. These multiple effects that work in opposite 
direction help explain why empirical studies show mixed results in different studies.  
  Interestingly, early contributors to this field Fleisher (1963, 1966) and Ehrlich (1973) 
clearly explain how labor market measures may pick up multiple effects, and they take pains to   24
explain that it is important to estimate these effects separately. Unfortunately, this point has been 
missed or underemphasized too often among subsequent scholars.  
  Some recent papers identify labor market measures for those who are on the margin. 
Gould et al. (2002) use per capita income to control for the general level of prosperity in the area 
and use various measures of low-skilled wages to isolate the effect of labor market opportunities 
from the regional economic trends. From the Current Population Survey, they calculate the 
wages of low-skilled, poorly-educated men and they also use the wages in the retail sector. They 
study whether local crime rates respond to the labor market conditions of those most likely to 
commit crime—unskilled men—rather than testing whether crime rates respond to the general 
economic conditions of the area.  
  Machin and Marie (2006) study how the introduction of the UK Job Seeker’s Allowance, 
which strengthened the qualification standards to receive unemployment benefits, affected crime. 
They find that this change in the law mainly influences people who are on the margin of 
engaging in criminal activity.  
  The minimum wage is also used to target those who may be more likely to experience an 
increase in criminal participation as a result of labor market conditions. Hansen and Machin 
(2002) use Britain’s introduction of a national minimum wage in April 1999 as a natural 
experiment. They calculate difference-in-difference estimators to uncover a statistically 
significant link between changes in crime and the degree to which people in the area earn low 
pay before the minimum wage was introduced.  
  Corman and Mocan (2005) use monthly time-series data from New York City between 
1974 and 1999 to investigate the effect that both deterrence and economic variables, such as the 
unemployment rate and real minimum wage, have on crime. While both types of variables help   25
explain the decline in crime, the contribution of deterrence measures is larger than those of 
economic variables.  
  In sum, studies that target labor market measures for those most likely to commit crime—
specifically low-skilled young men and those who are employed in the low-paying retail 
sector—provide more convincing evidence to buttress the claim that labor market prospects and 
success reduce illegal activity.  
 
 
4. Conclusion and Future Research 
  Much of the extensive 50-year-old literature that examines how labor markets affect 
crime is characterized by a central theme—there is a large disconnect between the theory that 
claims that better labor markets should reduce crime and the empirical research that has been 
unable to consistently document such a relationship. However, in the last ten years, research has 
addressed many of the problems that made it difficult to identify this relationship. A number of 
conclusions emerge from this new generation of research. First, the use of data at local levels like 
cities, counties, and census tracts, is now standard when using aggregate data. These studies are 
much more likely to document relationships between labor markets and crime than research that 
uses larger areas of aggregation. Because crime varies in important ways across even relatively 
small geographic areas, national or state-level data mask much of the important variation that is 
needed to identify causation. Although studies using individual data are less common, they also 
generally document strong linkages between the legal and illegal sectors.  
  Second, nearly every study that uses panel data finds economically and statistically 
significant relationships between labor markets and crime. Panel data estimation techniques like   26
fixed effects for regions and years control for unobserved differences and consequently reduce 
omitted variable bias. The studies that use cross section and repeated cross section data can 
control for fewer alternative explanations and show more ambiguous results.  
  Third, while the first three decades of research focused primarily on unemployment rates 
to proxy for labor markets, more recent studies analyze a broader array of measures, such as 
wages, education, and human capital. Because unemployment (which tends to be cyclical) and 
wages show markedly different time trends, studies with these alternative measures will 
necessarily provide different results. Furthermore, wages may better measure the underlying 
labor market opportunities, especially for low-skilled and poorly-educated males who are most 
likely to be on the margin of engaging in illegal activity. The studies that use both wages and 
unemployment generally find that wages explain more of the variation in crime than does 
unemployment.  
  Fourth, although many papers explore how crime influences wages, employment, and the 
growth of and location decisions of firms, little research attempts to control for this reverse 
causality to identify the effect of labor markets on crime. Early efforts to use instrumental 
variables and natural experiments to isolate the causal effects show mixed results about the 
magnitude of the bias due to reverse causation.  
  Fifth, the growing use of data from countries outside of the United States is interesting 
and beneficial for many reasons. In recent decades, the U.S. experienced different trends in 
illegal activity compared to many other industrialized and developing nations. Also, data from 
other nations present opportunities to understand crime in different contexts and to use new 
identification strategies. This is especially true for exploring endogeneity, which may require 
novel instruments or natural experiments.    27
  The new generation of studies in the last 10 years has made important progress in helping 
us better understand the relationship between labor markets and crime. The chief result is that the 
gap between the theory and empirical work that was once wide has been significantly narrowed. 
Research that best measures the labor market prospects of those who are most likely to engage in 
the illegal sector, and that best addresses important empirical problems, consistently shows that 
legal labor market opportunities substantially reduce crime. Some research estimates elasticities 
to be greater than one for some labor market measures on property crime and robbery, and others 
conclude that labor market measures explain up to 30 percent of the changes in property crime 
and robbery in the U.S.  Labor markets have a more modest effect on the remaining violent 
crimes. For murder, rape, and aggravated assault the coefficient estimates on labor market 
variables are smaller and the results show mixed levels of statistical significance.   
  In considering future research, the common tendency is to issue a call for more papers. 
However, because this gap between theory and empirics existed for so long in spite of a large 
number of papers, an appeal for more research will not significantly influence the field. Instead, 
high quality new research will take careful note of how the recent wave of scholarship has made 
important progress in resolving many consequential problems. Important advances can be made 
by continued use of better data and econometric techniques, exploring the data from other 
nations, analyzing the effects of a broader range of labor market measures, and finding new ways 
through natural experiments and other identification strategies to better identify the underlying 
relationship.  
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Figure 1 
Standardized Wages and Unemployment Rates of Non-College Men 
 
 
Source: Gould et al. (2002) Figure 6. The data were computed from the Current Population 
Survey. Non-college males are defined as full-time males between the ages of 18 and 65. 
Residuals were computed after controlling for a quartic in potential experience, years of 
school (within non-college), race (black and non-white, non-black), Hispanic 
background, region of residence, and marital status. Wages deflated to 1982-1984=100 
dollars. Mean residuals for each year were standardized to the base year 1979. 
 
 
Figure 2  
Retail Wages and Income Per Capita between 1979 and 1997 
 
Source: Gould et al. (2002) Figure 7. The plotted values are the coefficient estimates on the time 
dummies of county-level regressions of the log offense rates on time dummies, county fixed 
effects, and controls for age and population distributions, the sex composition, and the 
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